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2011 / The Niger Delta and Human Rights Lawsuits
"Niger Delta. Oil. Blood. Money.... this crude everywhere looks like
dark blood stains on the environment."
-Chris Agunweze'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it may not be apparent based on the effects of the 2008 recession,2
the world continues to grow economically.' An increasing demand for energy
accompanies this growth, and consequently an increased demand for oil.' As oil
companies race to fulfill this growing need, exploration and extraction are driven
to riskier locales where oil spills are more likely and more devastating.5
On April 20, 2010, a BP oil well exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. 6 The rig,
called the Deepwater Horizon, sank and spilled 206 million gallons of oil into the
sea,7 which threatened life and ecosystems both in the water and onshore.' Two
decades earlier, on March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground in
Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling 10.9 million gallons of oil.9 National and
international conversation erupted after both instances.'0 Much of the
commentary focused on criticizing the oil company executives deemed
responsible, lamenting the harm done to the environment, searching for a
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2012; B.A.,
Psychology, California State University, Sacramento, 2009. I sincerely thank Professor Stephen McCaffrey and
my Associate Comment Editor, Justin Rodriguez, for their invaluable insight and guidance in writing this
Comment.
1. Chris Agunweze, This Crude is Like Dark Blood Stains, DAILY SUN (Nigeria) (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://64.182.81. 172/webpages/features/special-%20reports/2010 oct/07/special-report-07- 10-2010-002.htm.
2. See generally NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF THE DECEMBER 2007 PEAK
IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1 (2008), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html.
3. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY AND WINTER FUELS OUTLOOK (2010),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html.
4. See id.
5. John Flesher & Harry R. Weber, Big Oil Explores Riskier, More Dangerous Options to Meet Growing
Energy Demand, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/l1/05/big-oil-
explores-riskier- n_779356.html.
6. Dina Cappiello, Panel: Gov't Blocked Scientists on Spill Estimate, ABC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id= 11816570.
7. Id.
8. David Biello, The BP Spill's Growing Toll on the Sea Life of the Gulf, YALE ENV'T 360 (June 9, 2010),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/theoil_spills._gmwing-toll on-sea-life-in-the gulf-of-mexico/2284/ (interview of
Thomas Shirley).
9. Cutler J. Cleveland, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (June 9, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.eoearth.org/article/ExxonValdezoilspill.
10. Ben Tracy, Angry BP Backlash Growing Across the Country, CBS NEWS (June 2, 2010, 9:18 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/02/eveningnews/main6541866.shtml; Terry Atlas, Tanker's Woes
May Propel Bill: Fire Could Push Congress to Pass Measure on Oil Spills, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1990, at C4;
John Vidal, Nigeria's Agony Dwarfs the Gulf Oil Spill. The U.S. and Europe Ignore It, THE OBSERVER (May
30, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/30/oil-spills-nigeria-niger-delta-shell.
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solution to the ecological damage, and rallying aid for the people affected
economically and physically by the spills." Lawsuits were filed almost
immediately to redress the wrongs done to those injured, including the many
fishermen who lost their way of life and only source of income as a result.'2 In
the case of the Exxon Valdez spill, the lawsuits resulted in hefty punitive damages
of $5 billion, reduced on appeal to $2.5 billion, and eventually cut to $507.5
million by the U.S. Supreme Court.'3 Lawsuits against BP will likely result in
comparable, if not heavier, penalties. 14
More recently, on May 1, 2010, an Exxon Mobil pipeline in Akwa Ibom,
Nigeria ruptured and spilled over one million gallons of oil in the Niger Delta
("Delta").' 5 In fact, in the past 50 years, one and a half million tons of oil have
been spilled there, 6 the equivalent of an Exxon Valdez disaster every single
year. 17 Yet the media spotlight and international legal responses to these disasters
in the Delta pale in comparison to the reactions to Exxon Valdez or the recent BP
oil spill. 8 For a people already beaten down from constantly living in an oil-
drenched region, the BP oil spill only confirmed what they already knew: the
international community is either unwilling to help, unable to heed their cries, or
simply does not care about the Delta crisis.'9 In the words of a member of the
Ogoni tribe,
The oil companies just ignore it. The lawmakers do not care and people
must live with pollution daily. The situation is now worse than it was 30
years ago. Nothing is changing. When I see the efforts that are being
made in the U.S. I feel a great sense of sadness at the double standards. 20
Since the Delta crisis began half a century ago, a handful of different legal
forums have attempted to address and rectify the problem, including the African
Commission on Human and People's Rights ("Commission"), the United States
11. See Brooke Sopelsa, More than 6,000 Lawsuits Filed Against BP, CNBC (June 9, 2010, 12:29 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/37593191?par=yahoo; see also Atlas, supra note 10; Curt Anderson & Thomas
Watkins, Gulf Spill Draws Flock of Lawyers, MSNBC (May 1, 2010, 3:42 PM), http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/36888206/ns/usnews-environment/.
12. Sopelsa, supra note 11; Kyle Hopkins, Health of Exxon Valdez Cleanup Workers Was Never
Studied, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (June 29, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/29/96782/health-
of-exxon-valdez-cleanup.html; Anderson & Watkins, supra note 11.
13. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 480, 514 (2008); see also Anderson & Watkins, supra
note 11.
14. Anderson & Watkins, supra note 11.
15. Vidal, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See Adam Nossiter, Far From Gulf a Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at
A 1, available at http:/www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/1 7nigeria.html?r= 1.
19. Id.
20. Vidal, supra note 10.
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("U.S.") Federal Courts, and the Nigerian National Courts. In addition, other
international forums exist that could potentially establish jurisdiction over the
human rights abuses in Nigeria. Yet, the crisis in the Delta has only gotten worse
since oil was discovered in Nigeria over 50 years ago." Thus far, the
international legal system has failed to adequately address the plight of the Delta
residents." Therefore, an effective international legal response to the
environmental damage and human rights abuses caused by oil companies and
23their government counterparts is necessary.
One way to rectify the human rights abuses is to attack them from an
environmental angle and take advantage of the present-day shift towards
24
enthusiasm for conservation and environmental protection. Though this
approach may be criticized as putting the environment first and human rights
second, doing so may be the most prudent way to tackle the root of both
problems, which is the environmental damage itself.5 By harnessing the sudden
international attention to the environment and directing it to the crisis in the
Delta, as well as other situations like it, the people affected by chronic oil
pollution just might receive the help they so desperately need,
6
Ecuador provides an extreme example of vindicating human rights through
27environmental lawsuits . In 2008, Ecuador amended its constitution to grant
inalienable rights to nature.2" Article 71 gives ecosystems, natural resources,
living plants, and creatures the right to "exist, flourish and evolve. 29
Ecuador intends this new substantive right to allow suits vindicating
environmental rights around the world and has claimed universal jurisdiction
over such suits.30 In reaction to the BP oil spill, environmental groups brought
suit against BP in late 2010 on behalf of the Gulf of Mexico, more specifically
21. See id.
22. See generally Ambrose 0.0. Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative
Overview of the Law and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 93-95
(1995).
23. See Koriambanya S.A. Carew, David and Goliath: Giving the Indigenous People of the Niger Delta
a Smooth Pebble-Environmental Law, Human Rights and Re-defining the Value of Life, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
493, 522-23 (2002).
24. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 103, 103-05 (1991).
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See Sofia Jarrin, BP Sued in Ecuador for Violating the Rights of Nature, UPSIDE DOWN WORLD
(Nov. 30, 2010, 8:41 AM), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/ecuador-archives-49/2805-bp-sued-in-ecuador-
for-violating-the-rights-of-nature; see also Derek Ford, BP Sued in Ecuadoran Courts for Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill, PSL (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www2.pslweb.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=14891&news-
ivctrl= 1261; BP Sued in Ecuadorian Court for Violating Rights of Nature, DEMOCRACY NOW (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/11/29/headlines/bpsuedjin-ecuadorian court_forviolating_
rights ofnature.
28. Jarrfn, supra note 27; Ford, supra note 27.
29. Jarrin, supra note 27; Ford, supra note 27.
30. Jarrin, supra note 27; Ford, supra note 27; DEMOCRACY NOW, supra note 27.
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 24
the ocean and ecosystems in affected Latin American countries.3 This approach
is so radical, however, that success for plaintiffs is doubtful." The plaintiffs, who
include environmentalists and indigenous leaders from many countries, have
demanded full disclosure of all documents and information pertaining to the spill;
yet, the U.S. Government has helped BP prevent this discovery.33 Also, because
the rights of the environment are touted in a governing instrument internal to
Ecuador,34 they are not binding on other nations, individuals, or entities until they
are agreed to in a treaty or become a jus cogens norm.3' Ecuador's
acknowledgment of the dire environmental consequences oil spills pose, and the
need to rectify them, is nonetheless a step in the right direction.
This Comment will analyze the attempts and failures of national and
international legal regimes to adequately address the environmental damage
caused by Delta oil spills and the human rights abuses that occur as a result. The
Delta crisis is utilized as a case study to demonstrate the current disparity in
global response to oil spills, depending upon the geographic location of the spill.
International substantive law as it currently exists is grossly inadequate to
respond to oil spills occurring in remote regions of the world. The law also fails1 6
to uniformly regulate oil companies.
This Comment will also recommend the development of an international
treaty that encompasses onshore oil production activities, to be modeled after the
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation ("OPRC"), which addresses pollution from offshore oil
exploration. A Special International Tribunal for Oil Spills ("Tribunal") should
be established to oversee implementation of the treaty provisions and adjudicate
disputes. To supplement the Tribunal, a community justice mechanism, entitled
Gacaca proceedings, should be instituted in nations like Nigeria that also suffer
from government corruption and violent human rights abuses in connection with
oil exploration. Section II gives a brief chronology of the Delta crisis,
showcasing the history of oil exploration and spillage in the area, the
environmental effects on the people, and the extent of related human rights
abuses. Section III provides a legal background identifying the substantive law,
forums and other legal mechanisms currently available that have been used in an
31. Jarrfn, supra note 27; Ford, supra note 27; DEMOCRACY NOW, supra note 27.
32. See generally Ford, supra note 27; DEMOCRACY Now, supra note 27.
33. Jarrin, supra note 27; Ford, supra note 27.
34. Jarrin, supra note 27; Ford, supra note 27.
35. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining jus cogens as a "mandatory or peremptory
norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted").
36. See Guy Chazan, Shell Faces Query on Nigeria-Dutch Parliament Hearing Expected to Touch on
Corruption in Oil-Rich Delta, as Spills Spur Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2011, at A10; see also Sopelsa,
supra note 11; Jarrfn, supra note 27.
37. Carew, supra note 23, at 519.
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attempt to address the Delta crisis. Section IV details past attempts to redress
environmental damage and human rights abuses in the Delta and explains why
these responses have not only been ineffective, but also inadequate. In
consideration of the reasons for these past failures, Section V proposes drafting a
new international treaty addressing onshore oil pollution and the creation of a
Tribunal to adjudicate the human rights cases arising from the Delta crisis, as
well as claims arising from oil spills around the world. Section V also suggests
the implementation of Gacaca proceedings in the Delta and similar regions.
II. THE HISTORY OF OIL IN THE DELTA
A. Oil Exploitation and Spillage
After oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1958, exploration and exploitation in
the country exploded." Home to the world's tenth largest crude oil reserves,39
Nigeria is the fourteenth largest producer of petroleum in the world and seventh
largest exporter.4n Oil companies elevated Nigeria to this status through routine
seizure and pollution of indigenous lands.4' It remains the cornerstone of Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd.'s ("Shell") oil operations,
accounting for one-fifth of the company's total oil production in 2009.42 While oil
extraction in developed countries involves many environmental safeguards and
much opportunity for community input, exploration in countries like Nigeria is
characterized by lax safety standards, if they even existed in the first place.43
Since Shell first came to the Delta, it has used outdated operations and
materials that are not only in poor condition, but would actually be illegal in
developed countries." Pipelines are maintained inadequately, which in turn leads
to oil well blow-outs.4 ' These blow-outs release uncontrolled amounts of oil,
causing damage that is only exacerbated by the notorious failure of oil companies
38. Carew, supra note 23, at 496.
39. Chazan, supra note 36.
40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRIES OVERVIEW (2011), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov
country/index.cfm.
41. See Carew, supra note 23, at 497-98; Daniel Cameron Morris, Nigeria Oil Exploitation and Human
Rights: Worldwide Example for Violence Against Civil Rights Leaders or Inspiration for Freedom for All
Indigenous Peoples?, WORLD POVERTY & HUM. RTs. ONLINE (Apr. 12, 2010), http://wphr.org/2010/
danielcameronmorris/nigeria-oil-exploitation-and-human-rights-worldwide-example-for-violence-against-civil-
rights-leaders-or-inspiration-for-freedom-for-all-indigenous-peoples/.
42. Chazan, supra note 36.
43. Andrew Rowell, Environmental and Social Costs of Living Next Door to Shell, Shell-Shocked: The
Environmental and Social Costs of Living With Shell in Nigeria, GREENPEACE INT'L (July 1994),
http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/hell.html#cont.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Carew, supra note 23, at 500.
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to clean up their spills. 6 This is due, in large part, to the lack of pollution
41prevention in the area.
The combination of blow-outs and little to no anti-pollution regulations
creates a recipe for disaster.4s High pressure gas pipelines cross through lands
once used for agriculture, and through villages, only a few meters away from
homes.49 Consequently, oil spills occur in these same areas.50 In addition,
companies like Shell engage in gas flaring in close proximity to villages, creating
acid rain, causing health problems, and destroying plants, wildlife, and food
51
sources.
To add to the problem, oil refineries dispose of their toxic wastes directly
into the environment, often into Delta waters through drainpipes.52 All of this
exploration has resulted in one and a half million tons of oil in the Delta spilled
over the past 50 years,5 3 of which approximately seventy-seven percent has not
been recovered and thus remains in the environment. 4 Presently, there are 606 oil
fields in the Delta, earning it the title "world capital of oil pollution.",
5
B. Extent of Related Human Rights Abuses
Human rights abuses in the Delta encompass a broad range of violations,
56
including breach of the right to life and the right to a healthy environment.
These infringements result directly from the effects of oil spills in the
environment as well as indirectly from government action in furtherance of oil
• 57exploration."
46. Rowell, supra note 43; Carew, supra note 23, at 500.
47. Rowell, supra note 43.
48. See id.
49. See id.; Carew, supra note 23, at 499.
50. See Rowell, supra note 43; see also Carew, supra note 23, at 499. Though there are no doubt severe
impacts on the health of Delta residents as a result of these spills, especially considering the low life expectancy
in the Delta, a thorough search for scientific studies on these health consequences have turned up nothing. The
lack of available data on cancer rates, reproductive consequences, etc. leaves this author even more suspicious
of Shell and the Nigerian government, as this implicates a cover-up scheme.
51. Rowell, supra note 43. Gas flaring is a process by which unusable natural gas is released by pressure
valve and burned, releasing extensive amounts of carbon dioxide.
52. Carew, supra note 23, at 500-01.
53. Vidal, supra note 10.
54. See Nnimmo Bassey, U.N. Report on Nigeria Oil Spills Relies Too Heavily on Data from Shell, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2010), http:/Iwww.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/201 /aug/25/un-nigeria-oil-spill-
shell (the 77% figure was offered for the years 1976 to 1996, and there is no data or information to suggest
clean-up policies were different prior to or after that period).
55. Vidal, supra note 10.
56. Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. & Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, Case No.
ACHIPRICOMMIA044/1, Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts. Decision Regarding Commc'n 155/96, para. 50
(2001), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/allcases.html [hereinafter Decision].
57. Id.
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Indigenous tribes in the Delta, including the Ogoni, have traditionally been
subsistence farmers and fishermen. s As 1.5 million tons of oil have saturated the
land and polluted the waters over the past half century, Delta residents have been
deprived of their way of life.59 Crops simply cannot grow in oil, and fish cannot
survive in it.6° Yet, the residents live in complete dependence on the environment
for farming, fishing, drinking water, and basic survival.6 The damage from the
spills has prevented residents from shrimping and gathering mollusks and
shellfish, eliminating dietary staples.62 Additionally, residents live in continuous
noise and air pollution, and have no access to clean drinking water.63 Currently,
life expectancy in the Delta region is merely 40 years due to this environmental
damage. 4 These vast environmental harms are recognized by many world
governments under the relatively new category of a human right to a healthy
environment, and also implicate the traditional human right to life and
development.
Aside from the aforementioned human rights violations, violent human rights
violations have also been perpetrated in furtherance of oil exploration.66 This
violence is occurring at the hands of the people's own government. 6' Through the
auspices of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company ("NNPC"), the Nigerian
government holds a direct financial interest in the oil exploration and exploitation
activities of Shell, as well as other oil companies in the Delta.68 Over the past 50
years, as part of this relationship, the government has aided oil companies by
providing ongoing security forces to oil operations and quashing attempted
protests and rebellions.69 At Rivers State in the 1990's, the Nigerian police force
took out the entire Umuechem village (at Shell's request) in response to the
villagers' protest of Shell's oil exploitation in the region.7°
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People ("MOSOP") was
organized in 1990 in response to Shell's activities in Ogoniland, with the aim to
engage in non-violent protests to protect the environment, cultural rights, and
58. See Carew, supra note 23, at 497.
59. Vidal, supra note 10 (detailing residents' loss of forest, farmland, drinking wells, and water to fish
in); see Decision, supra note 56, at para. 9.
60. See Nossiter, supra note 18 (noting the lifeless swamps of the Delta and the mangrove forests now
devoid of shrimp and crab).
61. Vidal, supra note 10; see Decision, supra note 56, at para. 67.
62. Nossiter, supra note 18.
63. Carew, supra note 23, at 499-500.
64. Vidal, supra note 10.
65. Carew, supra note 23, at 506-12.
66. Id. at 513-15.
67. Id.
68. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 1.
69. Maureen Chigbo, The Naivety of Shell, UNEP, NEWSWATCH (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.News
watchngr.conindex2.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=2399&temid= .
70. Carew, supra note 23, at 515.
350
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practices of the Ogoni People, among other goals.7 ' Beginning in 1993 the
Nigerian government reacted violently to these protests by beating, raping,
shooting and killing Ogoni residents, attacking villages, looting, and destroying
property. 2 The government's grave mistreatment eventually culminated in the
most widely publicized illustration of the Nigerian government's policy of
violence-the execution of the Ogoni Nine. 3
The killings were in 1995 in response to the group's activism against Shell's
activities in Ogoniland. 74 The tragedy began with the arrests of Ken Saro-Wiwa,
President of MOSOP, John Kpuinen, youth leader, and seven other Ogoni leaders
and MOSOP members. 75 The men were repeatedly detained and tortured before
being tried by a special military tribunal for the murder of four former Ogoni
leaders, their predecessors.76 The military tribunal was established by the
Nigerian government for the special purpose of trying these men.77 All nine were
convicted of the murders based on fabricated evidence provided by the
government, and subsequently executed. 78 Thus the core of Ogoni leadership was
eliminated with one fell swoop.79 Shell was implicated in recruiting the Nigerian
military and police to attack villages and suppress opposition, and then in aiding
and abetting these attacks." Specifically, Shell provided food and transportation
to the Nigerian military forces, allowed Shell's property to be used for planning,
and paid the soldiers to engage in the attacks." Oil companies and the Nigerian
government have thus succeeded together in plaguing the Delta environment with
oil pollution, silencing those who protest with violence.
C. Alleged Contribution of Delta Residents to the Damage
In September 2010, a preliminary report issued by the United Nations
Environment Programme ("UNEP") sparked international debate."2 The report
stated that ninety percent of the oil spills in Ogoniland were caused by local
71. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2dCir. 2010); About Us, MOVEMENT FOR
SURVIVAL OGONI PEOPLE, http://mosop.org/about-us.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
72. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
73. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000); Xiuli Han, The Wiwa Cases,
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 433, 433-34 (2010); see also Grant McCool, U.S. Judges Dismiss Nigerian Violence Case
vs Shell, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN17173
3 12 2 0 100 9 17.






80. Id.; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
81. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92; Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
82. See Bassey, supra note 54.
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pipeline vandalism and theft. 3 Shell, which has more oil wells in the Delta than
any other company, is allegedly only responsible for ten percent of the spills,
which implies that Delta residents are primarily responsible for their own
suffering. s' Though residents do engage in some pipeline vandalism, the report's
drastic findings are controversial because, by UNEP's own admission, the report
85was heavily funded by the oil industry and the Nigerian government.
It appears that these funding sources influenced not only the content of the
published report, but also the choice of experts used in preparing the report.8 6 For
example, in 2004, UNEP hired Professor Richard Steiner, an international expert
on oil spills, to write its oil damage and assessment manual, yet when he offered
to work on the 2010 report, UNEP declined 7 It is no mystery why the oil
industry and the Nigerian government would decline Steiner's offer-his
research suggests much of the oil spilled in Ogoniland has been caused by the
poor practices of oil companies like Shell, not by the theft and vandalism of
locals.88 Without oil industry contributions it would be impossible for UNEP to
prepare the report because no other potential source of funding exists.8 Since oil
companies would not be willing to fund a report that blames them for the Delta
crisis, UNEP has a strong interest in not hiring Steiner to prepare the report.9 If
UNEP retained him, their report would be unfunded and thus not prepared at all.9'
There are no other entities with both the interest in the state of the Delta as well
as the deep pockets necessary to fund such a report.92
Further damaging the credibility of the UNEP report, MOSOP notes that
many of the spills in the Delta occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the
rampant onset of vandalism in the region.93 These facts negate the report's claim
that ninety percent of spills are caused by pipeline vandalism. 94 They indicate that
damage caused by Shell's poor practice predated any alleged resident
contribution.9 Instead of using this independent research, however, the UNEP
report relies almost entirely on statistics provided by oil companies and the
83. Id.
84. Id.; Morris, supra note 41.
85. See Chigbo, supra note 69. Shell alone paid UNEP ten million dollars. The Nigerian government is
not only linked to oil companies through its own company, NNPC, and thus profits from their oil exploitation,
but is also responsible for many of the related human rights abuses through the government's provision of
police and security forces to Shell and other oil companies on demand.
86. See Bassey, supra note 54.
87. Id.
88. Id.




93. Id. (including the Ejama spill, Bumu spill, and Korokoro spill).
94. See id.
95. See id.
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 24
Nigerian government.96 Following the controversy after the initial version of the
report leaked in August of 2010, UNEP's Chief of Post Conflict and Disaster
Management, Henrik Slotte, issued a statement of regret in an effort to regain the
credibility of UNEP and deflect accusations of being bribed by the oil industry."'
Slotte apologized for UNEP pointing its finger so wholeheartedly at residents and
completely absolving oil companies, and stated UNEP had further research to do
before issuing the official version of the report.
98
Though they are not responsible for the initial pollution of the Delta, nor to
blame for the severity of the Delta crisis, residents have contributed to the oil
pollution by vandalizing safety valves, installing illegal taps, and attaching
explosive devices to access the oil.99 However, these acts are far outweighed in
number and effect by the immense number of old, rusting pipes and storage
tanks, corroding pipelines, dilapidated pumping stations, and wellheads poorly
maintained by the oil companies.' °° The pipeline failure rate in the Delta is
exponentially higher than anywhere else in the world.' 1 Resident contribution is
a direct result, not a cause, of the significant ecological damage inflicted by oil
companies in the Delta.' 2 Pipeline vandalism and oil theft are undertaken in
protest to the dirty, impoverished living situation Delta residents are left in while
the government continues to get richer as a result.'"3 Sales of small quantities of
stolen oil are no more than a means of survival for the people of the Delta.' °4
96. Bassey, supra note 54.
97. Chigbo, supra note 69; Onche Odeh, Niger Delta: The Hague to Hear Fresh Charges Against Shell,
DAILY INDEP. (Jan. 24, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201101250007.html; John Vidal, Outrage at U.N.
Decision to Exonerate Shell for Oil Pollution in Niger Delta, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2010), http:l/m.
guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/aug/22/shell-niger-delta-un-investigation?cat=environment&type=article.
98. Chigbo, supra note 69.
99. Vidal, supra note 10.
100. Id.
101. Nossiter, supra note 18.
102. See Vidal, supra note 10; Sokari Ekine, A Post Petroleum Nigeria, NIGER DELTA SOLIDARITY
(Nov. 29, 2009), http://nigerdeltasolidarity.wordpress.com2009/11/29/a-post-petroleum-nigeria/ (publishing
Communiqui by Nnimmo Bassey, Director of Environmental Rights Action in Nigeria and Chair of Friends of
the Earth International).
103. Fred Brume, Oil-Pipeline Vandalization in the Niger Delta: the Way Out, http://www.waado.
org/environment/OilPipelines/BrumeOnPipelineVandalization.htnl (last visited Sept. 12, 2011); see Carew,
supra note 23, at 497; Decision, supra note 56, at para. 1.
104. Cyril I. Obi, Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger
Delta, 30 CAN. J. DEV. STUD. 219 (2010); Onyebuchi Ezigbo, Nigeria: Unending Saga Between Oil Firms,
Vandals and Illegal Bunkerers, ALL AFR. (July 27, 2010), http://allafrica.con/stories/printable/
201007280120.html.
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III. EXISTING FORUMS AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A African Commission on Human and People's Rights
In the years since the onset of abuses in the Delta, a few forums have
acknowledged or at least attempted to rectify the crisis. Most of these attempts
have been part of a broader effort to address human rights violations.
The African Charter of Human and People's Rights ("Charter"), to which
Nigeria is a party, was the first international human rights charter to
simultaneously guarantee civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. °5
Article 24 of the Charter specifically states that all people have a right to "a
general satisfactory environment favorable to their development."' 6 Though
revolutionary (it is the first international document to recognize an environmental
right), the Charter lacks clarity in the legal obligations it demands as well as
implementation or enforcement mechanisms. 107
The Charter came into force in 1986 and established a Commission to
implement and enforce the rights guaranteed.'0 8 In theory, the establishment of
the Commission was a positive step, because the substantive human right to a
healthy environment is worthless if it is not accompanied by a procedural right
allowing parties to gain access to detailed information about the environmental
harm, the ability of affected parties to participate in decision-making regarding
whether a human right has been violated, and an opportunity for adjudication
when the right is violated. 9
B. U.S. Federal Courts
Far from the Delta and the African continent, the United States has also
attempted to develop law that would vindicate human rights abuses around the
world. The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act,
was enacted in the United States in 1789 to open U.S. federal courts as a forum
for foreign nationals to litigate tort suits against foreign actors for violations of
customary international law. "0 However, the ATS only creates jurisdiction, not a
105. Bernard H. Oxman & Dinah Shelton, Decision Regarding Communication 155/96, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 937, 941 (2002); see Decision, supra note 56, at para. 41.
106. African Charter of Human and People's Rights art. 24, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59.
107. EDITH BROWN WEISS, STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, DANIEL BARSTOW MAGRAW & A. DAN
TARLOCK, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 446 (2d ed. 2007).
108. History, AFR. COMM'N ON HuM. & PEOPLES' RTS., http://achpr.org/english/_info/historyen.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
109. WEISS ET AL., supra note 107, at 456.
110. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 369-70 (E.D. La. 1997); Han, supra note 73,
at 436.
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cause of action.' To establish jurisdiction, three elements must be met: the
claimant must be an alien, suit must be filed for a tort, and the tort must be a
violation of customary international law, which is the most controversial
requirement." 2 For the tort to be a violation of customary international law (that
is, an international tort), the violation must be definable, obligatory, and
universally condemned."3 Though suit under the ATS is complex, due mostly to
the ambiguous element of "customary international law," the U.S. federal court
system is appealing as a forum because juries hearing cases under the ATS may
award multi-billion dollar verdicts.1
4
C. Nigerian Laws
Efforts to address human rights abuses such as those in the Delta have also
been made at a local level."5 Like any modern nation, Nigeria has its own court
system with judicial mechanisms theoretically capable of addressing the oil
pollution crisis and prosecuting the related human rights abuses." 6 For example,
several anti-pollution laws are in force."7 One such law is the Oil Pipelines Act of
1956, which creates strict liability for oil pipeline license holders to people
victimized by faulty or broken pipelines." 8 Additionally, the Criminal Code
contains a law that punishes by imprisonment anyone who "corrupts the waters"
or "vitiates the atmosphere."" 9
Other legislation indirectly addresses the circumstances of the Delta crisis.
For instance, the Petroleum Act of 1969 primarily regulates the business aspect
of the petroleum industry, though it does empower the Minister of Petroleum
Resources (a cabinet member of the Nigerian federal government) to make
regulations for the prevention of pollution.'2° The Minister also has the power to
revoke oil mining licenses if certain requirements are not met, including, but not
limited to, the requirement to act in accordance with "good oilfield practice.",l2"
11. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2010).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 111 (where the central issue was whether there
was a violation of customary international law).
113. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370.
114. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 (stating that fear of such large potential verdicts often encourages
settlement in the multi-million dollar range); see also Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 2001 WL 986545 at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2001) (awarding $4.5 billion verdict).
115. See Decision, supra note 56, at para. 41.
116. Id.
117. Ekpu, supra note 22, at 79.
118. Id. at 89.
119. Id.; Criminal Code Act, ch. 23, § 245 (Nigeria), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Criminal%20Act-PartIII-IV.htm.
120. Ekpu, supra note 22, at 79; Government Ministries, COMMONWEALTH NATIONS, http://www.
commonwealth-of-nations.org/Nigeria/Government/Government_Ministries (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
121. Ekpu, supra note 22, at 79. As explained later, "good oilfield practice" is a vague term contributing
to the inadequacy of the Petroleum Act. The term is undefined in the statute and thus subject to broad
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An additional Nigerian statute addresses oil pollution directly.' 2 The Oil in
Navigable Waters Act of 1968 is Nigeria's attempt to comply with its
international obligation to prevent oil pollution of navigable waters. 123 As such, it
regulates oil discharge from ships at sea and in other waters navigable by sea-
faring vessels.'
In 1988, Nigeria greatly enhanced its environmental law when it passed the
Nigerian Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act ("FEPA").15 FEPA is
aimed at protecting the nation's air and interstate waters, as well as the health and
welfare of the Nigerian people.'26 Violations of FEPA, which include regulations
of the discharge of pollutants like oil, result in criminal penalties of extensive
fines and possible imprisonment.1
2
1
In addition, as stated before, Nigeria is a party to the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights and has specifically incorporated the Charter into
Nigerian domestic law, and thus has laws in force to address human rights
abuses.2 2 Following the fall of the military regime that reigned during many of
the human rights abuses in the Delta, a civilian administration came to power and
implemented "remedial measures" to address the Delta human rights crisis.1
2 9
These measures include the establishment of a Federal Ministry of Environment
to oversee industry operations affecting the natural environment in Nigeria, the
Niger Delta Development Commission to supervise and approve development
projects posing a potential impact on the environment, and the Judicial
Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations.'30
D. International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") is a relatively new forum that on
the surface appears capable of addressing some of the violent human rights
abuses in the Delta. World nations came together in an unprecedented manner in
1998 when 120 states adopted the Rome Statute establishing the ICC.'3' The
interpretation by the then-acting Minister.
122. Id. at 83.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 84.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 41 (stating that Nigeria incorporated the Charter in its domestic
law so human rights suits can be brought in national courts).
129. See id. at para. 30; Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 937; Horace G. Campbell, Nigeria:
Remembering 50 Years of Independence, ALL AFR. (Sept. 30, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201010010
585.html.
130. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 30; About Us, NIGER DELTA DEV. COMMISSION,
http://www.nddc.gov.ng/about%20us.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
131. About the Court, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 24
Rome Statute came into force four years later after ratification by sixty states."'
ICC jurisdiction is limited to the gravest crimes capturing international attention:
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. '33 Nigeria is a party to the
Rome Statute and thus grave crimes committed there could be called into
question before the court. 34 In order to establish jurisdiction, however, the human
rights abuses in the Delta would have to fit in one of the aforementioned
categories of "grave" crimes. 35
E. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966
Covenants
The United Nations ("U.N."), of which Nigeria is a member state, has taken
its own steps to assure human rights in all world nations.'36 In 1948, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("Declaration").'3 7 Article 25 of the Declaration declares that everyone has a right
to a standard of living sufficient for his health and well-being. 138 Though not
binding by itself, many of its provisions are thought to have passed into
customary international law.
139
As a follow-up to the Declaration, in 1966, the U.N. established binding
human rights obligations by drafting two international treaties: the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("CCPR") and the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ("CESCR").'40 Nigeria is a State Party to both. 4 While the
provisions of the CCPR were immediately binding on States Parties, the
visited Jan. 28, 2011).
132. Id.
133. ICC at a Glance, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.intlMenus/ICC/About+the+Courticc at a
glance/icc at a glance?lan=en-GB (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
134. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, Assembly, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.intlMenus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
135. See id.; see also ICC at a Glance, supra note 133.
136. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/217 (I1), at
pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948); see also Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1982); United Nations Member States, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
137. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 136.
138. Id.; see also Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1992).
139. McCaffrey, supra note 138, at 8.
140. Sohn, supra note 136, at 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Status of
Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/PageslViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=-4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter CCPR UNTC]; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 10,
2011) [hereinafter CESCR UNTC].
141. Nigeria, U.N. HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/NGIndex.aspx
(last visited Feb. 18, 2011); CCPR UNTC, supra note 140; CESCR UNTC, supra note 140.
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provisions of the CESCR required only a commitment to take progressive steps
to the extent possible considering each state's resources.142
The thrust of the CCPR is its guarantee of the right to life, which has
traditionally been interpreted as a guarantee against arbitrary deprivation of life
by the state.' 3 Recently it has been interpreted more broadly so as to include an
affirmative state duty to preserve life.' " The CESCR goes further and specifically
recognizes the right to an adequate standard of living including food and
housing. 45 This covenant thus recognizes the human rights that are being abused
in the Delta, and would be interpreted to encompass the right to water for
drinking and agriculture, and to live in an environment free of oil pollution .
46
IV. WHY PAST LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND
RESULTING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DELTA HAVE BEEN INADEQUATE
A. Decision Regarding Communication 155/96
In 2001, the African Commission on Human and People's Rights
("Commission") issued a decision finding that the Nigerian government breached
many human rights obligations. 47 Though the decision was a step forward in
recognizing that human rights abuses are occurring in the Delta, the decision had
no binding effect and no enforcement mechanism. 48 Hence, there has been no
change in the Delta crisis. 49 On March 14, 1996, two nongovernmental
organizations filed Communication 155/96 ("Communication") on behalf of the
Ogoni people with the Commission.'5 ° The Communication alleged that the
Nigerian military government, working with NNPC and Shell, engaged in oil
production that caused environmental degradation and health issues in the
Delta."'' This production resulted in the inappropriate disposal of toxic wastes,
caused many avoidable spills near villages, and poisoned soil and water. ' In
addition, the Communication alleged that the government aided these violations
142. Sohn, supra note 136, at 19.
143. McCaffrey, supra note 138, at 9.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Id. at 11.
146. See id.
147. See Decision, supra note 56; Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 937.
148. See Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 942.
149. See id.
150. See Decision, supra note 56, at para. 49; Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 937; Guidelines for
Submission of Communications, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS., http://www.achpr.org/
english/_info/guidelines communicationsen.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) (a Communication is similar to a
Complaint in the U.S. judicial system).
151. Decision, supra note 56, at paras. 1-2 (health issues included skin infections, gastrointestinal and
respiratory ailments, increased cancer risk, and neurological and reproductive problems).
152. Id. at para. 2.
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by providing oil companies with legal, security, and military powers; failing to
monitor or study the effects of oil extraction activities; withholding information
from the Ogoni; executing Ogoni leaders; beating and killing civilians; and
destroying their villages and property.'53
On May 27, 2001, the Commission issued the decision, finding that Nigeria
had breached numerous commitments to human rights contained in the Charter. '
5
The decision found that the NNPC, along with Shell, took actions in violation of
the right to enjoy guaranteed rights and freedoms without discrimination; the
right to life, property, health, housing, food, free disposal of wealth and natural
resources; and a general satisfactory environment favorable to the people's
development.5 5 The Commission identified state obligations to respect, promote,
protect, and fulfill the human rights guaranteed by the Charter. 5 6 Included in
these obligations is the respect of individuals and the collective group of local
residents to their resources, legislation and remedies to protect residents from
interference with their rights, and actual action of the state to realize guaranteed
rights.57 The decision sets forth affirmative duties of the Nigerian government to
monitor and control multinational company behavior in Nigeria through
procedures such as independent scientific monitoring, environmental impact
assessments, public information and input, and access to enforcement
mechanisms.'5 8 The government was also required "to take reasonable and other
measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote
conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of
natural resources."'59 By concluding with the suggestion that all Charter rights be
enforced through national forums or through the Commission, the decision had
strong potential to remedy the human rights abuses in Nigeria and beyond. 161
Over eight years later, however, the dire situation in Nigeria is still making
headlines.'6' Though strongly worded, the Commission's recommendations in its
decision were only meaningful to the extent the Nigerian government chose to
enforce them.6 1 Clearly it has chosen not to, due to its strong economic interest in
maintaining the status quo of oil exploration and abuse in the Delta.163 Because
the Commission cannot make the government act, and substantive human rights
153. Id. at paras. 3-7, 62.
154. Id. at Findings; see also Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 937.
155. Decision, supra note 56, at paras. 50-67; Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 937.
156. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 44.
157. Id. at paras. 45-46.
158. Id. at para. 53.
159. Id. at para. 52.
160. Id. at para. 68, Findings; see also Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 942.
161. See generally Vidal, supra note 10; Nossiter, supra note 18.
162. See Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 942.
163. See Chigbo, supra note 69.
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are worthless without an effective process to protect and enforce them,'64 the
Commission is an inadequate forum to adjudicate human rights abuses in the
Delta.
As a follow up and complement to the Commission, an African Court on
Human and People's Rights ("African Court") was developed.16 Nigeria is one of
25 African Union member states that have ratified the African Court's protocol.'"
Thus, the court has jurisdiction to issue a binding judgment if suit were to be
brought against the Nigerian government. 67 An enforceable judgment against the
Nigerian government could be sufficient to convince the government to cease its
own human rights abuses and stop aiding the oil companies in perpetuating
human rights abuses. 6 s This is especially true because states may be held liable
for actions of private parties if the state does not exercise due diligence to
prevent, investigate and respond to human rights violations.'69
The problem with the African Court as a forum, however, is that it has been
slow to develop and will likely be slow to gain credibility, even if it does have
binding authority.7  The African Court issued its first and only judgment on
December 15, 2009."' Deliberations in that case were criticized for consuming an
inordinate amount of time while resulting in a comparatively short judgment with
many technical errors. 72 Thus far, the African Court is viewed by many as
unorganized and procedurally inadequate. 3 Furthermore, funding, which is
already a problem for the Commission, becomes exacerbated as the Commission
and African Court must now share the already limited funds. 7 4 Neither the
Commission nor the African Court looks promising as a guarantor of human
rights in the Delta.
164. See generally WEISS ET AL., supra note 107, at 446.
165. Court History, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS., http://www.african-court.org/ en/court/history/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (the court was developed in 1998 and has obviously not assumed the duties of the
Commission, considering the decision was issued many years after the development of the Court).
166. Court Mandate, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS., http://www.african-court.org/en/court/
mandate/general-information/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
167. See id.
168. See GEORGE MUKUNDI WACHIRA, MINORITY RIGHTS GRP. INT'L, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: TEN YEARS ON AND STILL NO JUSTICE 22-23 (2008).
169. Shelton, supra note 24, at 123.
170. Roland Adjovi, Questionable Precedent: The First Ruling by the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, JURIST (Dec. 21, 2009), http:/jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumyl2009/12/questionable-precedent-first-
ruling-by.php. See generally Court History, supra note 165; see also generally Home, AFR. CT. ON HUM. &
PEOPLES' RTS., http:l/www.african-court.org/en/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
171. Adjovi, supra note 170; see also Latest Judgments, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS.,
http://www.african-court.org/enlcaseslatest-judgments/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
172. Adjovi, supra note 170 (stating the Judgment was only thirteen pages, only three of which
consisted of legal analysis, and additionally was missing references and some explanations of findings).
173. Id.
174. HELLE BORGSTROM ET AL., EVALUATION 1998: THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS xii, 13, 41 (1998), available at http://www.humanrights.dk/files/pdf/Publikationer/
afr.commmanus.pdf.
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B. The Wiwa Cases in U.S. Federal Court
Suit has also been brought in U.S. federal courts under the ATS.'75 Following
the settlement in Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria,
Ltd.'7 6(Shell Nigeria) in 2009, U.S. courts seemed like a promising forum to
adjudicate the Delta human rights abuses."' Wiwa plaintiffs secured a $15.5
million settlement, a sum not even remotely possible in their national courts or
other world forums.'78 Thus, the ATS appeared to be the answer for victims of
human rights abuses in the Delta. As such, subsequent to the execution of the
Ogoni Nine, the families of the victims filed suit in U.S. federal court under the
ATS against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company ("Royal Dutch") and Shell
Transport and Trading Company PLC ("Shell Transport"), alleging the
companies, through subsidiary Shell, aided and abetted the Nigerian government
in carrying out human rights violations.1
7 9
Adding to the disappointment and desperation Delta residents feel, however,
on September 17, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that companies cannot be held accountable in U.S. courts for human
rights abuses in foreign countries.8 0 Thus, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., the Court eliminated the ATS as a possible vehicle of redress for the
environmental damage and related human rights abuses in the Delta.'8'
In Kiobel, the Court held that customary international law governs the scope
of liability under the ATS and that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over
claims brought against companies.112 Corporate defendants are not subject to
liability under the ATS because they are not subject to liability under customary
international law.' 3 The Second Circuit noted that companies have never been
held liable, civilly or criminally, under customary international human rights
law.'14 The court further noted that corporate liability is not a specific, universal
175. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2010).
176. Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig. Ltd., 335 F. App'x 81, 2009 WL 1560197, at *l (2d Cir.
2009).
177. Han, supra note 73, at 433-34.
178. Ed Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m over Saro-Wiwa Killing, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/O8/nigeria-usa.
179. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (Royal Dutch is a
Netherlands corporation, Shell is incorporated in the United Kingdom, and SHELL is incorporated in Nigeria.
Claims were originally brought for aiding and abetting (1) extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against humanity; (3)
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violation of rights to
life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction. Of these original claims, all
were dismissed except 2-4.); see also McCool, supra note 73.
180. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 148-49; McCool, supra note 73.
181. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 148-49; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2010).
182. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 148-49.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 148.
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and obligatory norm and thus the harm was not a norm of customary
international law.
85
In fact, even if a legal norm is well-established in domestic law, that does not
make it part of customary international law.186 Rather, ATS liability depends on
the universal and specific rules that nations of the world treat as binding when
dealing with each other.'87 Both the cause of action and the defendant sued must
be subjects recognized under customary international law.""' Federal courts must
consider "whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a company."'89 If companies are not universally treated as defendants
against which judgments may be rendered, then federal courts may not hold them
out as such under the ATS. 9°
The court in Kiobel also noted that individual actors working for a company
may still be held liable under the ATS for tortuous conduct they personally
engage in, 9' but this is likely unhelpful because the deep pockets of companies
are what make recovery under the ATS an attractive option.' 9' In some situations
corporate directors may be indemnified for actions within the scope of their
duties, but companies are rarely required to indemnify directors. 19'
Indemnification is dependent on applicable statutes, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, and contracts between the company and its directors.194 As there are
many oil companies operating across the globe with various states of
incorporation,' 95 indemnity laws would be divergent and difficult to apply, falling
short of a dependable, efficient method to address situations like the Delta
crisis. 96 Should indemnification be established as an option in ATS suits,
companies would certainly write indemnity out of their internal articles of
incorporation and bylaws, if they had such provisions to begin with.' 97 Thus, the
Kiobel decision, in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over
companies, disqualified yet another forum from providing the legal response
necessary to address these abuses in the Delta.'98
185. Id. at 121-22.
186. Id. at 118.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 118-20.
189. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004).
190. Id.
191. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 122.
192. See generally id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring).
193. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 304 (3d ed. 2010).
194. Id.
195. See Leading Oil and Gas Companies Around the World, PETRO STRATEGIES, INC., http://www.
petrostrategies.org/Links/WorldsLargest_.Oil-and Gas-CompaniesSites.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
196. See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 193, at 304.
197. See generally id.
198. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010).
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The concurring opinion in Kiobel characterized the majority opinion as a
"substantial blow to international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental
human rights."' 9  Judge Leval emphasized his view that the decision would allow
companies to commercially exploit abuse of fundamental human rights and then
shield their resulting profits.200 Because the concurring opinion was so strong in
Kiobel, and the issue is so relevant to the state of corporate affairs in the world
today, appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was not surprising. The likelihood of a
grant of certiorari was questionable, because the Supreme Court recently denied
certiorari in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,"" a similar
case from the Second Circuit, which also held that there is no corporate liability
under the ATS . As a Circuit Split became more apparent this year, however,
the Court responded by granting certiorari in Kiobel.2 °3 A jurisdictional split has
existed for some time, as a federal district court sitting in the Ninth Circuit held
in Doe v. Unocal Corp. that companies could be liable under the ATS.20'
However, the case settled before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals could decide
the issue.0 Now, the D.C. Circuit has held that companies can be held liable
206under the ATS °. It will be interesting to see how the Supreme Court resolves
the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. A ruling allowing corporations to
be held liable under the ATS would at least grant some relief to the people of the
Niger Delta.
Apart from being an inadequate forum to adjudicate claims against oil
companies, however, U.S. courts are also inadequate because they are incapable
of prosecuting the Nigerian government due to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act ("Act").2 7 Under the Act, Congress proclaimed foreign states immune from
208the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, as a courtesy from one nation to others. Since
both the oil companies and Nigerian Government share responsibility for the
abuses, though, both need to be held liable.0 9 In addition, U.S. courts should not
199. Id. at 149-50, 154-55 (Leval, J., concurring only because facts not pled specifically enough to show
aider and abettor acted with a purpose to bring about the abuse of human rights).
200. Id. at 149-51 (Leval, J., concurring) (noting the danger of the majority's rule and its potential to
give a free pass to commercial exploitation of sex slavery, piracy, and corporation-commissioned genocide to
protect profits from indigenous groups).
201. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 79, 79 (2010); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
202. Id.
203 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491,2011 WL 4905479 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011).
204. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Rachel Chambers, The Unocal
Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, INT'L
NETWORK FOR ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RTs,, 16, http://www.escr-net.org/usr.doc/Chambers.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2010).
205. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92; Chambers, supra note 204, at 14.
206. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
207. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (West 2010).
208, See id.
209. See generally Robert McLaughlin, Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International Actors
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be the sole international forum to address international wrongs-that would place
too high a burden on the U.S. system.21° If the international community cares to
recognize and vindicate human rights abuses, world governments should share in
the cost to prosecute the claims."' American taxpayers should not have to bear
the cost of adjudicating disputes that did not occur in the United States, and may
not even involve U.S. actors.2 2 U.S. resources should be expended on U.S.
cases.2 13  Furthermore, the U.S. court system is already impacted and
overburdened without being assigned responsibility to adjudicate the world's
human rights abuses.24
C. Nigerian National Responses
National means of redress exist in Nigeria's judicial system, 215 though these
216have also failed to adequately address the human rights abuses in the Delta.
Because the Nigerian government is so intimately involved in the oil exploitation
in the Delta and directly responsible for many of the human rights abuses at
issue, Nigerian courts are inadequate to address the Niger Delta crisis.
2' 7
As noted by the Commission, Ogoniland has received far too much
international attention for the Nigerian government to be unaware of the crisis in
the Delta.28 This notice has afforded the government decades to remedy the crisis
domestically, yet it has failed to act.219 In 1993, the Nigerian military government
actually enacted decrees eliminating national court jurisdiction over oil-spill-
related violations, and any adequate domestic remedy along with it.22 0 Though the
military government is now defunct, the new government has recognized in a
Note Verbale that atrocities continue to be committed by oil companies in
Ogoniland and the Delta. 1 If anything, civilian rule by the "President's
government" has only changed the types and locations of human rights abuses, asS 222
mass assaults and murders are ongoing. Though the Nigerian government'soffer of amnesty to militant leaders seemed to decrease violence in the Delta for a
Responsible for Environmental Crimes, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 377, 385-87 (2000).
210. See Hugh King, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VICT. U. WELLINGTON
L. REv. 1, 23 (2006).
211. See generally id.
212. See generally id.
213. See generally id.
214. See generally id.
215. See Ekpu, supra note 22, at 79-93.
216. Decision, supra note 56, at paras. 38, 58, 66.
217. Id.; see also Oxman & Shelton, supra note 105, at 938.
218. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 38.
219. Id.
220. Id. at para. 41 (citing The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1993).
221. Id. at para. 42 (a Note Verbale is a diplomatic communication).
222. Carew, supra note 23, at 517.
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period, Nigeria saw an upsurge in violence towards the end of 2010, an
indication that the attempt to quell the unrest has failed.2
The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency ("NOSDRA")
blames the deficiencies in Nigerian laws and its law enforcement for the
continually worsening crisis in the Delta. 24  Most Nigerian regulations and
221statutes are too vague to be effective. Instead they grant such wide discretion to
implementing agencies that enforceable regulations are either never implemented
226to begin with, or are not enforced at all. In the rare event that courts do hear the
cases, the compensation awarded is nominal. 7
In a recent attempt to utilize the national system, community leaders filed a
claim in a local court for one billion dollars for damages to the health and
livelihood of residents following the May 1, 2010 Akwa bom spill.228 Success,
though, is highly doubtful. 9 Most Nigerian statutes and regulations create no
private right of action for victims of oil pollution.230 Plaintiffs who bring common
law tort actions usually cannot show the lack of reasonable care necessary to
establish breach of duty because doing so in such a technical industry would
require expert scientific evidence that poverty-stricken, uneducated residents
cannot find or afford. 23' Even when courts invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the inference is rebuttable by expert evidence, which oil companies
have seemingly unending funds to acquire.232 The other substantive law in
Nigeria is equally unsatisfactory. Though the Oil Pipelines Act seems directly
applicable to the Delta crisis, it has been in force since 1956 and the situation in
the Delta has only continued to significantly deteriorate since then. 231 Provisions
of the Criminal Code, while highly applicable, cannot be properly applied to
corporate violators.23 Criminal penalties are based on individual guilt and
responsibility. 23 Similarly, punishment is tailored to individuals. 236 An entire
company cannot be incapacitated or deterred by being sent to jail. 37 The
remaining statutes touching on oil pollution tend to be only incidental in nature,
223. Chazan, supra note 36.
224. Vidal, supra note 10.
225. Ekpu, supra note 22, at 96-98.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 87.
228. Vidal, supra note 10.
229. Id.
230. Ekpu, supra note 22, at 90-91.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 91; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (res ipsa loquitur is a tort doctrine signifying
the accident itself proves negligence).
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buried in statutes and regulations concerning related subject matter, such as the
Petroleum Act of 1969 introduced earlier.238 Regulations are usually vague,
assign no clear responsibility for oil spill cleanup, and lack any specific
sanction.239
In the Petroleum Act, "good oilfield practice" is undefined and thus the Act
is ineffective to regulate oil companies. 2" Though in force since 1988, the Act
has provided Nigerian residents little or no damages for harm suffered.24' Any
efficacy of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act is trumped by its narrow geographic
restrictions (which do not encompass the affected Delta lands) and by the broad
range of defenses set forth in the 1968 Act.242 Since the Delta pollution is inland
in non-navigable waters, the 1968 Act is simply not substantively broad enough
to address the crisis. 243 Though FEPA does provide for specific and serious
criminal penalties for environmental pollution, its scope is not broad enough to
cover many Delta waters and lands, and in reality its terms seem harsher than the
penalties actually imposed.244 Rarely are the seemingly serious penalties set forth
actually utilized.24' Also, there is no absolute bar on discharge of hazardous
substances in the nation's waters, but rather a vague prohibition of "harmful
quantities" of discharge.246 "Harmful quantities" goes undefined with no
indication of how to properly measure output.2 17 Similarly, the Federal Ministry
of Environment, the Niger Delta Development Commission, and the Judicial
Commission of Inquiry have thus far been ineffective.248 Quite simply, national
mechanisms in Nigeria fail to protect the human rights of Delta residents. 249 The
Commission agreed when it concluded that no adequate domestic remedies exist
in Nigeria.
D. Corporate Criminal Responsibility
Though the temptation is there, holding companies criminally responsible
has been consistently rejected by customary international law.21' First of all,
though the Delta crisis is a travesty, it is unlikely the abuses there would meet the
238. Id. at 79-81.
239. Id. at 80-81.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 87.
242. Id. at 83.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 84-87.
245. id.
246. id. at 85.
247. Id.
248. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 30, Findings.
249. Carew, supra note 23, at 518.
250. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 41.
251. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
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required standard of "grave" crimes.252 Delta residents have been injured and
killed due to the environmental damage and related violence, but the injuries and
deaths are not on par with a mass genocide.253 Furthermore, the Rome Statute
establishing the ICC upholds the principal originally articulated at the Nuremberg
trials that the individuals who perpetrate international crimes should be the ones
punished, not the corporate entity under which they act.254 Essentially, moral
responsibility can only be felt by an individual, not a juridical entity.211 Similarly,
a company is incapable of possessing the intent required of criminal law; only the
individuals working for the company are capable of experiencing intent.25' As
intent is generally a critical element for criminal liability, adjudicating the Delta
human rights abuses in a criminal forum simply would not work. 7 The
objectives of criminal punishment (including retribution, deterrence and
2-58rehabilitation) could not be met if imposed on a juridical entity, which further
demonstrates that criminal liability is not the solution for the people of the Delta.
E. Human Rights Guaranteed by the United Nations
Neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor either of the two
U.N. Covenants has been invoked to address the Delta crisis, even though
Nigeria is a State Party to all three.259 This is likely the case because the U.N.
Human Rights regime is unequipped to address the types and extent of abuses in
the Delta.260 The right to health and well-being in Article 25 of the Declaration is
a "welfare right" as opposed to a "liberty right," and thus is not a binding
obligation but rather closer to a goal or ideal.26 Under the Declaration itself, then,
there exists no enforceable means of redress for the people of the Delta.
26 2
Though the CCPR right to life has been interpreted more broadly as of late, it
263
has not been interpreted so broadly as to include a right to sustenance or water.
States are not required to guarantee to its citizens clean drinking water or water
suitable for use in agriculture.264 Though the violent human rights abuses in the
252. See generally ICC at a Glance, supra note 133.
253. See generally id.
254. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136-37 (stating that a proposal at the Rome Conference to grant the ICC
jurisdiction over juridical persons like companies was rejected).
255. Id. at 149.
256. Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 166 (Leval, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 166-67 (Leval, J., concurring) (stating objectives of criminal punishment are retribution,
disablement of offender, changing offender's conduct, dissuading others from criminal conduct).
259. See Nigeria, supra note 141.
260. See McCaffrey, supra note 138, at 7-12.
261. Id. at 8.
262. See id.
263. Id. at 10.
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Delta constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life by the state and therefore could fit
under the binding CCPR, the root of the Delta crisis is the environmental damage
and a satisfactory legal regime would be capable of addressing all human rights
abuses involved-not just the violence.26
The CESCR is posed to address the human rights abuses directly resulting
from the oil pollution in the Delta, but the covenant is, for all intents and
purposes, nonbinding since States Parties must only "take steps" toward its
266realization. Article 16 of the CESCR does require States Parties to submit
reports on their progress in achieving the objectives of the covenant to the U.N.
Economic and Social Council ("Council"). 267 These reports are furnished in
stages, and hence need not be submitted annually or even frequently.268
Specialized agencies (such as non-governmental organizations) may also submit
reports to the Council regarding a member state's progress.269 The Council may in
its discretion submit these reports to the Commission on Human Rights, which
270may then make recommendations.
Clearly, any rights established by the CESCR are almost entirely ideological
and completely unenforceable.27 ' Thus, Nigeria must only take progressive steps
towards realizing these rights, as constrained by its resources 2  Even if the
Commission on Human Rights were to make recommendations to a member state
after reviewing its reports, these recommendations would also be nonbinding. 3
Hence, though the U.N. Human Rights regime encompasses goals applicable to
the Delta crisis, the regime is not in a position to meaningfully address and
adjudicate the human rights abuses in the Delta. 4
V. PROPOSED FORUMS AND SOLUTIONS
To address the Delta crisis in a meaningful and successful manner, the ideal
substantive law and forum(s) must allow for prosecution of both governments
and companies that share responsibility for human rights abuses. 275 In the case of
the Delta, only by working together could those entities have achieved such
265. See generally id.
266. See id.
267. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 16, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CESCR].
268. Id. at art. 18.
269. Id.
270. Id. at art. 19.
271. See McCaffrey, supra note 138.
272. See id.
273. See id.; see also CESCR, supra note 267, at art. 21.
274. See generally McCaffrey, supra note 138.
275. Decision, supra note 56, at para. 14; see also Campbell, supra note 129 (noting it is the alliance
between the military government and oil companies that is responsible for much of the Delta crisis).
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prolific damage to the environment and humanity f 6 To date, no forum exists that
is capable of prosecuting both culprits. A true human rights claim can only be
asserted against a government, not private individuals or companies, so a new
forum, besides a human rights court, is necessary to bring actions against the oil
companies directly."7 Because neither existing forums nor traditional types of
adjudication and punishment are sufficient to adjudicate human rights claims
arising out of the actions in the Delta, a novel approach is necessary, even if it
may seem radical.
A. Special International Tribunal for Oil Spills
1. Why the World is Ready for a New Regime
Frequent and serious oil spills occur onshore and offshore around the world,
to which legal responses differ drastically.2 8 Because legal response largely
depends on the legal system of the spill site, the same oil company can expect
different legal standards in different oil exploration sites. 79 Company executives
are thus able to implement more lax standards in certain regions where they
know that the chances of liability for environmental damage and resulting human
rights abuses are much lower."' This line of thinking was only reinforced by the
Kiobel decision, which (at least for the time being) confirmed no corporate
liability in certain U.S. federal courts for acts committed abroad.28 '
To rectify the problem of different standards, a new legal regime is
necessary. The regime should include substantive law setting forth a uniform
worldwide code of conduct for oil companies and governments. It should also
establish a new forum to adjudicate any and all disputes arising from oil spills
resulting from violations of that code of conduct.
Critics may caution that a similar approach was attempted before. In 1974,
concern about different world standards led to the United Nations General
Assembly resolution on the Declaration of a New International Economic Order
("NIEO"), which aimed to develop a code of conduct for multinational
companies.2 2 The United States and other Western countries, fearful that profits
would be adversely affected, strongly opposed the NIEO.2 3 Over time, blame for
276. Campbell, supra note 129.
277. See Sohn, supra note 136, at 18-19 (noting that human rights obligations are binding on states and
that no state is allowed to deprive individuals of guaranteed human rights).
278. See generally Carew, supra note 23, at 522-23.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. McCool, supra note 73.
282. James Thuo Gatthi, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 125, 139-40 (2009).
283. Id. at 140.
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the condition of developing countries shifted away from allegedly corrupt
multinational companies. Instead of attributing the lack of economic growth
and human rights abuses in developing countries to multinational companies
operating there, the public centered the blame on the internal governmental
corruption in those countries."5 Finding a multinational company code of conduct
unnecessary, the NIEO was never implemented.8 6
Several decades have passed since the NIEO was considered. Since then, the
responsibility for, and involvement of multinational companies in, human rights
abuses in the developing world are much more evident. 7 Also, with the recent
coverage of the BP oil spill and the public concern it generated, the time may be
ripe to establish an international code of conduct for oil companies operating
288globally.
If anything good can be said to have come from the BP spill, it has at least
raised worldwide awareness and scrutiny of western oil companies, particularly
with regard to safety and environmental precautions and standards. 9 Sharon
Gesthuizen, a Dutch Socialist Party lawmaker, visited the Delta in 2010 and
joined the opposition parties in the Netherlands in setting parliamentary hearings
of Royal Dutch Shell PLC in late January 201 1.290 Gesthuizen and
nongovernmental organizations presented reports at the hearings, detailing the
corruption in the Delta.29' The Socialist Party expressed hope that the European
Union will act against the Nigerian government officials involved in the
corruption by imposing sanctions including visa restrictions. 292 Though the
hearings were purely for fact-finding purposes, and thus did not provide the
adjudication that is necessary to vindicate the ongoing human rights abuses in the
Delta, they are a step toward corporate accountability in Nigeria, and elsewhere
around the world.293
In another example of progression towards accountability in Delta-type
situations, on February 14, 2011, a court in Ecuador granted a judgment ordering
Chevron Corporation ("Chevron") to pay $8.6 billion for the environmental
damage caused by oil exploitation in the Amazon in the 1970s . 4 The Ecuadorian
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concurrently with the Ecuadorian state oil company to extract oil in the Amazon
forest, leaving behind an environment plagued with contamination.295  This
pollution was shown to cause cancer, death, and reproductive defects.296 Though a
respectable step in the right direction and an indication that some judicial systems
do recognize the gravity of the harm committed by oil companies, the judgment
was immediately appealed by both sides, causing the saga to continue.23 Even if
the judgment were upheld on appeal, its enforceability is highly questionable.
Thus, the $8.6 billion judgment is a nice gesture, but likely will have no teeth.299
Nonetheless, developments in places like The Netherlands and Ecuador do
suggest at least some world governments may now be receptive to an idea they
rejected only a few decades earlier-a code of conduct for multinational
companies. 3°°
2. Proposed Structure for the New Regime
A new treaty setting forth a code of conduct for onshore oil spills and
establishing a court accessible to all world nations would be the perfect
accompaniment for the recent attention generated for the Delta crisis. In its
Decision Regarding Communication 155/96, the Commission recommended the
need for a forum to ensure adequate compensation to human rights violation
victims, comprehensive cleanup of the environmental harm caused by oil
extraction, independent oversight bodies for the oil industry, and community
involvement in decisions to extract oil.30' Thus, both the current state of oil
exploration as well as future expectations about energy needs demand the
establishment of new substantive law and a single forum to adjudicate cases
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. Litigation has been ongoing for seventeen years and will certainly last many more as the appeals
are litigated.
298. Id. U.S. Federal Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New York immediately issued a
Temporary Restraining Order preventing enforcement of any damages award against Chevron. In addition,
international arbiters ordered Ecuador to suspend enforcement of the judgment. Seven months later, in
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enforcement outside of Ecuador. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs have agreed to wait to collect damages until the
appeals process is complete in Ecuador. Chevron continues to issue statements indicating confidence that the
judgment was fraudulent and will be found unenforceable. As Chevron has no assets in Ecuador, enforcement is
impossible there. Mark Hanmblett, Federal Judge Blocks Enforcement of Likely Judgment Against Chevron,
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resulting from oil spills. 02 To date, no international treaty exists addressing the
cleanup of onshore and inland oil spills.3 3
A similar treaty exists in the field of oil pollution, however, which could
serve as a model for a treaty governing inland spills. °' The OPRC is an
international treaty accepted by Nigeria that addresses cleanup of offshore oil
spills.3°5 Expansion of its jurisdiction to include inland oil spills may be a solution
to the Delta crisis. Parties to the OPRC are required to establish measures for
handling offshore oil spills and pollution.3 6 The requirements encompass the
need to develop national or regional action plans to address oil spill emergencies,
to stockpile equipment with which to address offshore spills, and to actually
practice responses to spills by performing training drills.3 7 Further, parties are
required to assist other members in the event of a spill emergency.3 8 Parties
capable of doing so must provide advisory services, technical support, and
equipment at the request of another party.30 9 Additionally, parties must take the
legal and administrative steps necessary for activation, transport, and arrival of
the requisite equipment and response force.31° The OPRC also encompasses
reporting and response procedures as well as guidelines for research,
development, and technological cooperation."' These guidelines ensure that
parties do not duplicate research efforts, thus saving time and money.3 2 They also
guarantee that all parties share the same state-of-the-art oil spill response and
clean-up techniques and technologies.313 This way, no country is disadvantaged
and all countries are able to perform a uniform response to oil spills.
31 4
The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") hosted the diplomatic
convention that resulted in the OPRC, and has assumed an active role in
implementing the terms agreed to by the parties."' Though no formal
adjudicatory mechanism exists in the OPRC, the IMO has played an instrumental
role by coordinating funding to carry out the OPRC provisions and by analyzing
302. See generally Carew, supra note 23, at 522-23.
303. See id. at 519-20.
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and establishing the details of many of the aspects of the OPRC.36 These include
details pertaining to national and regional action plans, technical assistance, and
resource mobilization." 7 In 1991, the OPRC Working Group was established to
oversee implementation of the OPRC." s The Working Group is composed of
experts from industry, environmental organizations, and governments.3 9 It has
drafted and issued numerous manuals to the parties outlining response
320mechanisms step-by-step. Manuals and field guides are tailored to specific
subsets of oil spill response, such as the appropriate mechanisms for tropical
waters and detailed guides focusing solely on application of oil dispersant.3 1' To
provide parties active learning opportunities, it hosts training sessions and
workshops using the manuals and guidelines.322 In addition to the Working
Group, the OPRC Information System maintains several databases that contain
the names and contact information for oil spill response assistance. 12 The IMO
also maintains a Research and Development database to compile all international
research on oil response mechanisms to facilitate the goal of uniform state-of-
the-art oil spill response. 4 In addition, the IMO promotes and operates many of
the regional agreements contemplated by the OPRC.32' Thus far, the OPRC has
been deemed successful by international experts, as it has resulted in a reduction
of marine oil spills and has increased preparedness and response cooperation
among world nations. 3 26 Due to this success, as well as the need to cover
additional subject matter originally left out, in 2000 the IMO followed the OPRC
with the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution
Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances ("OPRC-HNS").2 7 The same
IMO member states that signed the OPRC signed on to the new OPRC-HNS,
which indicates the parties to the original OPRC saw its principles and provisions
as helpful.32s
A treaty similar to the OPRC, but also encompassing inland spills and
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treatment of onshore oil spills and shoreline damage around the world.3 29 As the
oil spill damage in the Delta is primarily inland, such a treaty would provide a
helpful blueprint to determine the methods and sequence of events that should be
employed to clean up the Delta spills and like spills throughout the world.330
Establishing a mandatory forum to adjudicate claims arising out of oil spills
around the world, against both the companies and national governments
responsible for the harm would be even more beneficial."' The existence of a
single forum would ensure that people suffering human rights abuses due to oil
exploration and exploitation receive the same legal treatment and similar
judgments, despite their differing nationalities and the differing oil spill
332locations. Also, oil company executives could anticipate being held to the same
standards regardless of the country they are operating in.333 Civil redress is
appropriate because the goal is victim compensation and deterrence, which
334cannot be achieved unless it is imposed upon the company.
In addition to having jurisdictional authority to address environmental
damage from oil spills and the related human rights abuses, the Tribunal would
also have jurisdiction to enjoin governments from the commission of violent
human rights abuses. The Tribunal would have authority to impose an immediate
injunction for ongoing violence committed at the hands of government officials,
and also to sanction governments themselves by imposing monetary penalties for
wrongs already committed.
To ensure the purpose of authority to issue binding judgments against both
companies and governments is served, an enforcement scheme would also have
to be developed and incorporated in the treaty. To enforce judgments against
governments, it would be wise to follow the mandatory sanctions scheme already
implemented by the United Nations Security Council ("Council"), as it has been
finessed for several years and has proven successful.333 Sanctions imposed by the
Council include broad economic and trade sanctions, as well as travel bans, arms
embargoes, and other economic and diplomatic penalties tailored to the state or
situation.336 The Council has tailored these sanctions in the past to protect
vulnerable portions of the population so as to only penalize the government
actors and bodies truly responsible.337 To give ratification of the treaty meaning
329. See Carew, supra note 23, at 519-20.
330. See id.
331. See generally id. at 522-23. See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 152 (2d
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for companies, States Parties would have to agree to allow execution of Tribunal
judgments within their territory should the company violator have assets there. If
such agreement to execute is made a part of the treaty, companies would be
forced to acknowledge the uniform standards established by the treaty, and to
conform their behavior in accordance therewith. Thus, to ensure success of the
Tribunal, the treaty must specifically outline enforcement procedures to be used
in judgments against both government and private actors.
As the Tribunal would only hear cases arising from oil spills, it would be
prudent to staff the court with experts on oil spills and human rights, including
judges experienced in these areas and independent experts who could evaluate
the extent of environmental damage and human rights abuses. 3' The composition
of the court could be modeled after the OPRC Working Group and include
representatives from industry, environmental groups, and member
governments. 39 These same judges and experts would be involved in each case
that comes before the tribunal and would serve for four-year terms, with the
possibility of reelection for at least one additional term.-4 ' The governments of the
member parties would nominate judges on a rotating basis, and would each have
one vote in elections."' A panel of three or more judges could hear each case,
further ensuring neutrality.342 Staffing the Tribunal with expert judges would
contribute to the quality of the adjudication and consistency amongst cases, as
well as improve judicial economy as time and money would not be wasted by
various courts attempting to thoroughly learn about oil spills, marine pollution,
and human rights standards. 343 When judges without special training or expertise
consider technical or scientific data and disputes, it is inevitable that much more
time will be consumed adjudicating the case than if the judges on the panel were
already experts on the complex subject matter and could review the facts of the
case and adjudicate quickly.344
The same problems of expense and time consumption are faced when each
side recruits their own experts to testify during trial, as is the case in normal
litigation.3 45 Expert testimony is critical in properly adjudicating oil spill claims,
given the complex science involved in evaluating environmental damage, effects
situation.
338. See generally Edward V. Di Lello, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges
at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 474-79 (1993).
339. See Edwards, supra note 315, at 2.
340. See DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO & LEIGH SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD'S CASES 155 (2007) (stating that judges in
international courts generally serve terms of four to nine years with possibility of reelection for at least one
additional term).
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346
of the spill on ecosystems, and cleanup options. Thus, the role of expert
testimony cannot be eliminated completely for judicial economy. If the Tribunal
was staffed with independent experts who could evaluate the facts of each case
quickly and provide a neutral opinion, however, these burdens on the judicial
process would be substantially eliminated. 47 The independent experts could be
hired in a manner similar to the way in which the expert judges are elected: each
member country could nominate possible independent parties recognized for
their expertise in the relevant field and the countries could vote on hiring
decisions.3 48 The implementing treaty could set forth minimal educational and
experience requirements that must be met for nomination and election. Knowing
that renowned experts are evaluating their cases and that they are receiving the
same treatment and attention as cases in U.S. territories, such as the BP oil spill,
would help to rectify the wrongs felt by the people of the Delta.3 9
B. Gacaca Courts as a Supplemental Mechanism When Needed
A large part of the discontent felt by residents of the Delta is a feeling that
the world does not care about environmental damage or the human rights abuses
being inflicted on them by oil companies and their government.5 ° Though the
Tribunal would be tremendously helpful in establishing a consistent legal
response to oil spills, it is unlikely that the court will directly hear from all of the
people affected by the spills.35' With a population of over ten million in the Delta,
countless people have been affected throughout the half century of oil
exploitation.3 2 Furthermore, it is evident, based on the extent and number of
recorded violations, that numerous individual actors are guilty of the violent
human rights abuses in the Delta.353 Many government actors in the Nigerian
military and security forces worked together to rape, assault, and murder so many
victims.354 Because the Special International Tribunal on Oil Spills would engage
346. See generally Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill Response, NAT'L OCEAN AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN. (Oct. 28, 2010), http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/dwh.php?entry-id=809.
347. See Di Lello, supra note 338, at 483-85.
348. See TERRIS ET AL., supra note 340, at 22, 32-33.
349. See Vidal, supra note 10.
350. Nossiter, supra note 18.
351. See generally Morris, supra note 41 (noting 500,000 people in the Ogoni tribe alone are affected
and may have claims); see also generally Linda E. Carter, Justice and Reconciliation on Trial: Gacaca
Proceedings in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 41-42 (2007) (explaining that Gacaca
proceedings were instituted in Rwanda because the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda could not try
the over 100,000 alleged perpetrators).
352. Vanguard Media Ltd., Niger Delta Fund Initiative: Political Definition of N-Delta, EARTH RTS.
INST. (Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.earthrights.net/nigeria/news/definition.html; Nossiter, supra note 18.
353. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010); Victor Ojakorotu &
Lysias Dodd Gilbert, Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, INST. FOR
ANALYSIS GLOBAL SEC. 2 (May 18, 2010), http://www.iags.org/NigerDelta-book.pdf.
354. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123; Ojakorotu & Gilbert, supra note 353, at 2.
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in adjudication of suits against oil companies and governments, it would not be
an efficient forum to try individual members of the military and security teams
who participated in the harm as well.355 There would simply be too many
defendants, victims, and witnesses for the Tribunal to accommodate.35 6
Though oil spills damage the environment and quality of life of those who
live near and depend on the area, not all nations face the same government
involvement and violent human rights abuses as exist in the Delta. For example,
though the BP oil spill was incredibly damaging to the Gulf Coast, there have
been no allegations of corrupt government officials inflicting violence on the area
residents affected by the spill. Nonetheless, in regions of the world like the Delta,
violent human rights abuses regularly accompany environmental damage from
oil spills.357 Therefore, in some nations an additional forum to address further
harms related to oil spills would be necessary.
This additional forum could be modeled after creative community judicial
responses already proven successful in other areas of the world. For example, in
response to the Rwandan genocide, which also involved too many defendants
than could be feasibly tried in a formal tribunal, Gacaca proceedings were
implemented as a supplemental adjudicatory method to the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR").35' The ICTR investigated and tried the
military and government leaders responsible for ordering and carrying out the
genocide, while the Gacaca proceedings were able to try the many other guilty
individuals who participated in the genocide but did not serve a leading role.359
Gacaca trials consist of numerous small community hearings held in public areas
where residents attend and are deeply involved in the proceedings by asking
questions and giving testimony.3'6 While leaders and large-scale perpetrators of
violence were prosecuted at the ICTR, lower-level offenders were prosecuted in
Gacaca courts. 36 ' Defendants were questioned and confronted by their victims or
family members of the victims. 362 Proceedings were conducted by a group of
seven to nine community members who were specially-elected as judges by other
community members, recognizing them for their respect and integrity.
3 63
Gacaca proceedings revolve around confession and reconciliation.
364
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Confessions reduce the length of the prison sentence, and often result in a
reduced sentence involving community service.365 Thus, justice is served at the
hands of victims, yet reconciliation between victim and aggressor is achieved in
many instances after victims receive the apology they feel they deserve. 6 Also,
the defendant can help rebuild the community through early release community
service. 367 This type of proceeding allows the large number of people who feel
victimized to obtain some personal vindication, and has been proven successful
in Rwanda.36 s The end goal is a combination of justice and reconciliation.369
Millions of people have been victimized in the Delta.37 The Ogoni people's
entire way of life has been taken at the hands of oil companies, as have other
tribes.37' Individuals have been raped, beaten, and killed by government officials
in furtherance of oil company initiatives.372 Though a large monetary judgment
and a mandate that oil companies, including Shell, clean up the damage done in
the Delta are very important, individual hearings involving actual residents of the
Delta would likely go a long way in bringing peace to the region and quelling the
political and civil unrest. 77
Instituting Gacaca proceedings in the Delta would allow the Delta
community to prosecute past and present members of the government military
and security forces who committed human rights abuses.374 Like the Gacaca
proceedings in Rwanda, community service could be utilized in sentencing, and
defendants could be put to work cleaning up the oil damage to the Delta.3 75 Thus,
Gacaca proceedings in the Delta have the potential of improving the natural
environment and bringing much-needed peace to the region.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is hard to believe given the extent of the damage to the Delta
region, environmentalists predict the damage to the Delta's fragile environment
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370. See generally Morris, supra note 41 (given the number of people living in the affected regions and
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the Delta crisis).
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can be reversed and the region restored with concentrated efforts. 3 76 Similarly,
though generations of people from the Delta have suffered at the hands of the
government and oil companies, with effort, change, and international attention,
the damage to the Delta residents may be rectified.
A Special International Tribunal for Oil Spills would serve as a forum strong
enough to motivate the Nigerian government and oil companies to be
environmentally responsible and refrain from abusing the human rights of Delta
residents. If properly implemented, it would result in judgments that force clean-
up of past spills, resources to alleviate the living conditions of residents, and
injunctions preventing similar acts and damage in the future. Gacaca proceedings
would complement judgments of the Tribunal by facilitating reconciliation
amongst residents and restoring peace locally. It is important to develop adequate
substantive law and establish these forums as soon as possible.377 This is
especially true given Shell's recent announcement of hopes to reenter the Delta,
and the Nigerian government's announcement of intention to resume oil pumping
in the Delta with a new, yet unknown, partner.378 It is not anticipated that oil
exploration in the Delta will cease anytime soon. The extensive damage from the
past fifty years' of exploitation is ongoing. New forums to address the atrocities
are the only option left for the people of the Delta.
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